Washington widens the economic squeeze on Iran

In Tehran, 73-year-old Sadegh Mahmoudi is buying dollars with his remaining savings, AP reports. The rial reached 2.02 million to the dollar on August 24, before the new US measures were announced. That describes an economy already under strain, not a result of restrictions unveiled later that day.^[4]

Washington nevertheless made concrete decisions. Treasury announced almost sixty designations covering people, companies and vessels. An OFAC determination effective August 24 also extends its authority to sanction operators in Iran’s aviation, digital asset, gold, shipping and technology sectors. This does not automatically designate everyone in those industries.^[1][2]

OFAC suspends specified general licences for personal remittances, education, conferences and sporting or academic exchanges. A separate licence permits some transactions to wind down under conditions. The restrictions therefore reach civilian connections as well as the military networks Washington says it targets.^[3]

On August 28, Treasury takes another step: it proposes cutting Banque Misr UAE off from correspondent accounts at US institutions. Treasury alleges the bank processed funds linked to Iranian networks; that remains its allegation. The banking restriction is proposed, not final, and does not target Banque Misr's operations in other countries. Separately, OFAC does add a Bank Melli manager in Dubai and Kameng Trading Limited to its sanctions list.^[6][7]

On August 24, Washington removes Syria from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. OFAC says the prohibitions attached to that designation no longer apply. The week therefore brings different choices: greater pressure on Iran and removal of a legal obstacle for Syria. In both cases, the consequences for ordinary people still require scrutiny.^[5]

On August 28, Trump also announces an oil agreement with Venezuela, Reuters reports. He claims majority US control over more than 65 billion barrels of proven reserves. That claim carries major implications for sovereignty; it does not establish a legal transfer of control. We have inspected neither a signed contract nor a Venezuelan response.^[9]

Diplomacy also continues. On August 25, Oman and Iran set out a proposed framework for a temporary Hormuz corridor and joint mine clearance, in the Omani ministry's English account, labelled an unofficial translation. Technical negotiations are to continue. The proposal establishes neither an operational reopening nor a concession produced by sanctions.^[8]

Lost revenue, diplomatic concessions and people's welfare are separate outcomes. We need to follow who absorbs the costs and which decisions change. A falling currency alone answers neither question.